In this paper we defend structural representations, more specifically neural structural representation. We are not alone in this, many are currently engaged in this endeavor. The direction we take, however, diverges from the main road, a road paved by the mathematical theory of measure that, in the 1970s, established homomorphism as the way to map empirical domains of things in the world to the codomain of numbers. By adopting the mind as codomain, this mapping became a boon for all those (...) convinced that a representation system should bear similarities with what was being represented, but struggled to find a precise account of what such similarities mean. The euforia was brief, however, and soon homomorphism revealed itself to be affected by serious weaknesses, the primary one being that it included systems embarrassingly alien to representations. We find that the defense attempts that have followed, adopt strategies that share a common format: valid structural representations come as “homomorphism plus X”, with various “X”, provided in descriptive format only. Our alternative direction stems from the observation of the overlooked departure from homomorphism as used in the theory of measure and its later use in mental representations. In the former case, the codomain or the realm of numbers, is the most suited for developing theorems detailing the existence and uniqueness of homomorphism for a wide range of empirical domains. In the latter case, the codomain is the realm of the mind, possibly more vague and more ill-defined than the empirical domain itself. The time is ripe for articulating the mapping between represented domains and the mind in formal terms, by exploiting what is currently known about coding mechanisms in the brain. We provide a sketch of a possible development in this direction, one that adopts the theory of neural population coding as codomain. We will show that our framework is not only not in disagreement with the “plus X” proposals, but can lead to natural derivation of several of the “X”. (shrink)

This book examines the concept of “ Neurosemantics”, a term currently used in two different senses: the informational meaning of the physical processes in the neural circuits, and semantics in its classical sense, as the meaning of language, explained in terms of neural processes. The book explores this second sense of neurosemantics, yet in doing so, it addresses much of the first meaning as well. Divided into two parts, the book starts with a description and analysis of the mathematics of (...) the brain, including computational units, representational mechanisms and algorithmic principles. This first part pays special attention to the neural architecture which has been used in developing models of neurosemantics. The second part of the book presents a collection of models, and describes each model reproducing specific aspects of the semantics of language. Some of these models target one of the core problems of semantics, the reference of nouns, and in particular of nouns with a strong perceptual characterization. Others address the semantics of predicates, with a detailed analysis of colour attributes. While this book represents a radical shift from traditional semantics, it still pursues a line of continuity that is based on the idea that meaning can be captured, and explained, by a sort of computation. (shrink)

This book examines the concept of “ Neurosemantics”, a term currently used in two different senses: the informational meaning of the physical processes in the neural circuits, and semantics in its classical sense, as the meaning of language, explained in terms of neural processes. The book explores this second sense of neurosemantics, yet in doing so, it addresses much of the first meaning as well. Divided into two parts, the book starts with a description and analysis of the mathematics of (...) the brain, including computational units, representational mechanisms and algorithmic principles. This first part pays special attention to the neural architecture which has been used in developing models of neurosemantics. The second part of the book presents a collection of models, and describes each model reproducing specific aspects of the semantics of language. Some of these models target one of the core problems of semantics, the reference of nouns, and in particular of nouns with a strong perceptual characterization. Others address the semantics of predicates, with a detailed analysis of colour attributes. While this book represents a radical shift from traditional semantics, it still pursues a line of continuity that is based on the idea that meaning can be captured, and explained, by a sort of computation. (shrink)

In recent years, a number of different disciplines have begun to investigate the fundamental role context appears to play in a number of cognitive phenomena. Traditionally, linguistics, and the fields of communication and pragmatics in particular, have been the areas that have focused the most on contextual effects. Context has increasingly been studied for its role in influencing mental concepts, for some scholars being considered constitutive for most – if not all – concepts. Cognitive neuroscience is now starting to consider (...) in a systematic way how context interacts with neural responses, although this research is still scattered and concentrated in a small number of specific cases only. In this chapter, we attempt to tie these three levels together, since only from their integration can a comprehensive explanation of how context affects cognition be constructed. The way context drives language comprehension depends on the effects of context on the conceptual scaffolding of the listener, which in turn, is the result of his neural responses in combination to context. These neural responses derive from learning throughout the history of experiences of the individual, and the association between possible contexts and heard utterances. The road we take to accomplishing the multi-level integration between what appear to be distant domains, is a computational one. This approach meets with the mechanistic framework of explanation, which is currently held as the most appropriate way of approaching cognitive phenomena that is often characterized by a multiplicity of levels, as is the case with context. The core underlying concept of the neurocomputational framework here proposed, is an account of neural representation, based on structural similarity. Structural representations are still the best option on the market in cognitive science, but in their traditional form, derived from classical measurement theory, are affected by a number of serious drawbacks, including not being able to account for context. We suggest a different account of structural similarity, one informed by current neuroscience, where the homomorphic relations required for structural similarity are derived from neural population coding. In a preliminary mathematical sketch, we indicate how this approach can construct neural aggegations that are sensitive to context. (shrink)

Los sistemas argumentativos formalizan razonamiento de sentido común mediante la construcción, comparación y evaluación de argumentos a favor o en contra de ciertas afirmaciones. En tales sistemas existen dos nociones centrales: derrota y defensa. En el presente trabajo caracterizan ambas nociones y se discuten algunos desafíos para las caracterizaciones propuestas. Además, se realizan algunos comentarios al respecto.

Whereas geometrical oppositions (logical squares and hexagons) have been so far investigated in many fields of modal logic (both abstract and applied), the oppositional geometrical side of “deontic logic” (the logic of “obligatory”, “forbidden”, “permitted”, . . .) has rather been neglected. Besides the classical “deontic square” (the deontic counterpart of Aristotle’s “logical square”), some interesting attempts have nevertheless been made to deepen the geometrical investigation of the deontic oppositions: Kalinowski (La logique des normes, PUF, Paris, 1972) has proposed a (...) “deontic hexagon” as being the geometrical representation of standard deontic logic, whereas Joerden (jointly with Hruschka, in Archiv für Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie 73:1, 1987), McNamara (Mind 105:419, 1996) and Wessels (Die gute Samariterin. Zur Struktur der Supererogation, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 2002) have proposed some new “deontic polygons” for dealing with conservative extensions of standard deontic logic internalising the concept of “supererogation”. Since 2004 a new formal science of the geometrical oppositions inside logic has appeared, that is “ n -opposition theory”, or “NOT”, which relies on the notion of “logical bi-simplex of dimension m ” ( m = n − 1). This theory has received a complete mathematical foundation in 2008, and since then several extensions. In this paper, by using it, we show that in standard deontic logic there are in fact many more oppositional deontic figures than Kalinowski’s unique “hexagon of norms” (more ones, and more complex ones, geometrically speaking: “deontic squares”, “deontic hexagons”, “deontic cubes”, . . ., “deontic tetraicosahedra”, . . .): the real geometry of the oppositions between deontic modalities is composed by the aforementioned structures (squares, hexagons, cubes, . . ., tetraicosahedra and hyper-tetraicosahedra), whose complete mathematical closure happens in fact to be a “deontic 5-dimensional hyper-tetraicosahedron” (an oppositional very regular solid). (shrink)

Théophile De Donder, a Belgian mathematician born in Brussels, elaborated two important ideas that created a bridge between thermodynamics and chemical kinetics. He invented the concept of the degree of advancement of a reaction, and, in 1922, he provided a precise mathematical form to the already known chemical affinity by translating Clausius’s uncompensated heat into formal language. These concepts merge in an important inequality that was the starting point for the formalization of non-equilibrium thermodynamics. The present article aims to reconstruct (...) how De Donder elaborated his ideas and developed them by exploring his teaching activity and its connection with his scientific production. Furthermore, it emphasizes the role played by the discussions with his disciples who became his collaborators. The paper analyzes De Donder’s efforts in participating in the second Solvay Chemistry Council in 1925 to call the attention of chemists to his mathematical approach. We explain why his work did not receive much attention at the time, and how, despite this, his formalization of chemical affinity became the basis for the birth of the so-called Brussels school of thermodynamics. (shrink)

Emancipating from prejudices, dogmatism, fears and mistrust through direct participation is the knot of education for democracy to be solved for a discipline such as education which, in contemporary times, cannot and must never be deaf to change. The essential assumption is that citizenship education needs a solid ethical and moral dimension, as well as a personal and social one, before political and administrative; only when the awareness of the inviolable rights of individuals, men and citizens, of their indifferent protection (...) and awareness of the choices to be made for their exercise emerges from below, then it is possible to organize the step to be taken in the direction of educational and training choices. (shrink)

The success of a capitalist economy rests upon the ability of finance to sustain potentially infinite growth, based on funding today the output of tomorrow. Finance, however, needs rules. The aim of the law and finance scholarship is precisely to identify the best regulation of finance to support economic growth. Traditionally, law and finance is concerned with investor protection. This would be sufficient if the future were predictable. However, because the future is uncertain, the prices of financial assets are flawed (...) and in the short run they may result in serious mistakes, if not widespread crises. Although these mistakes are corrected in the long run, significant harm may occur in the meantime. Financial law should therefore be concerned not only with investor protection, but also with mitigating the temporary excesses of markets in allowing or restricting access to finance. The challenge of this goal is to remedy market myopia without allowing policymakers to abuse the power of governments. However imperfect, prices remain the best instrument of discipline and growth in a market economy. (shrink)

Existe uma tensão entre Teoria e História: “[...] a poesia é mais filosófica e de caráter mais elevado que a história, porque a poesia permanece no universal e a história estuda apenas o particular” (Aristóteles, 2007, 43). Esta afirmação de Aristóteles talvez tenha sido a primeira indicação da referida tensão entre as duas formas de conhecimento: a histórica e a teórica. Na citação acima, a filosofia é a referência de um pensamento hierarquicamente superior, sendo que sua legitimação enquanto tal passa (...) pela universalidade de suas verdades. É importante salientar que a poesia nesta reflexão aristotélica é uma forma de conhecimento, embora difira da história no que concerne à matéria do conhecido: na primeira, o fato poderia ter acontecido; na segunda, aconteceu. Porque aconteceu, o fato é singular, e que poderia ter acontecido cai no âmbito do universal. Neste sentido, a chave para a compreensão da tensão entre história e teoria é a universalidade ou singularidade do conhecimento adquirido: “[...] é evidente que não compete ao poeta narrar exatamente o que aconteceu; mas sim o que poderia ter acontecido, o possível, segundo a verossimilhança ou a necessidade. O historiador e o poeta não se distinguem um do outro, pelo fato de o primeiro escrever em prosa e o segundo em verso [...]. Diferem entre si porque um escreveu o que aconteceu e o outro o que poderia ter acontecido” (Aristóteles, 2007, 43). Ao situar a história em nível menos elevado que a poesia, Aristóteles parece ter suscitado em pensadores contemporâneos a ideia da distinção entre conhecimento histórico e conhecimento teórico. O presente estudo versa sobre a natureza do conhecimento histórico e seus impasses metodológicos no uso dos referenciais teóricos necessários às suas indagações fundamentais. (shrink)

Persae et Magi omnes qui Persicae regionis incolunt fines ignem praeferunt et omnibus elementis ignem putant debere praeponi. The Persians and all the Magi who dwell in the confines of the Persian land give their preference to fire and think it ought to be ranked above all the other elements.Iulius Firmicus Maternus was a Latin writer who lived in the fourth centurya.d. In the 340s, following his conversion to Christianity, he wrote theDe errore profanarum religionum, which has been preserved only (...) in the tenth-century manuscript Vaticanus Palatinus Latinus 165. In this work he argues against the pagan cults, calling for the emperors to suppress them. The first sections are dedicated to the pagan worship of the natural elements: objects of a cult are water among the Egyptians, earth among the Phrygians, air among the Assyrians. The chapter we are dealing with, the fifth, is dedicated to fire, a central element of the Zoroastrian religion. Greek and Roman writers, pagans and Christians alike, were aware of this, and references to some sort of fire-cult among Persians are numerous in literature and are found as early as Herodotus. Just like Firmicus Maternus, some authors also state that the Magi worship fire as a god or divine element and that they conduct fire-related rituals. In Greek and Latin authors there is a view that the Magi, these specialists of the rituals of the Persian religion, were originally a Median tribe. As shown by the passages of Ammianus and Basil, such knowledge was also available to Firmicus Maternus’ contemporaries, and there do not appear to be particular differences in the way in which Greek and Latin authors viewed the Magi in Achaemenid and Sassanid times. Regrettably, one cannot know for certain which of these sources Firmicus Maternus knew. (shrink)

non, si Cambysae redeant et flumina Croesi,dicat ‘De nostro surge, poeta, toro’. In these two lines Propertius is proud to say that his puella would not dismiss him for the fabulous treasures of some dives amator. The problem is caused by the interpretation of Cambysae as given in all the manuscripts; it is difficult to understand both as a genitive singular and as a nominative plural. This form of the genitive is not, in fact, recorded before Apul. Fl. 15.12, and (...) the concurrent form Cambysis is even less common. Moreover, the Persian king Cambyses was not an example of opulence in Antiquity like the Lydian king Croesus, but of cruelty. The only passages where he is linked with the idea of richness are Apul. Mun. 26.13–15: Cambyses et Xerxes et Darius potentissimi reges fuerunt. Horum praepotentiam, quam ex opibus collegerant, lenocinium vitae effecerat celsiorem, and Juv. 14.328–31: Si nondum implevi gremium, si panditur ultra, | nec Croesi fortuna umquam nec Persica regna | sufficient animo nec divitiae Narcissi, | indulsit Caesar cui Claudius omnia, cuius | paruit imperiis uxorem occidere iussus, where we find apparently the same connection between Persian royalty and Croesus' richness that we read in Propertius' line. (shrink)

the scholion of the “Commenta Bernensia” to Lucan 8, 824–826 about the Sibylline oracle concerning the prohibition for the Romans to send a military contingent to Egypt reveals both the influence of late antique commentaries cum notis variorum and the presence of allegedly genuine details about the history of the late Roman republic from sources now lost.

The subject of the ethical vocation of Nietzsche’s thinking is arousing increasing interest in the history of the ethics of the analytic tradition. Recent studies have sought above all to dissolve the conflicts that arise from the attempt to reconcile his open immoralism with his project of revaluing all values. According to John Rawls, Nietzsche is a moral elitist: the value that he attributes to the lives of great men such as Socrates or Goethe shows that the search for knowledge (...) and the cultivation of the arts by a few capable individuals is important enough to justify the sacrifice of values such as freedom and justice. This reading cannot account for the special educational role that Nietzsche recognizes in the great artists and great philosophers. In order to ground this hypothesis, I shall examine the significance of the subject of self-elevation in Schopenhauer as Educator. Following James Conant’s reading, I want to support the view that Nietzsche can be placed within that register of the moral life that Stanley Cavell called moral perfectionism. My conjecture is that the perfectionist line runs through the entire arc of Nietzsche’s thinking and is the basis of the various lines of criticism in his critique of morality. (shrink)

Discutindo acerca das centenas de detecções de planetas extrassolares, que supostamente aconteceram desde 1989 e que ele considera (incorretamente) como instâncias de observações, Peter Kosso disse, justamente, que segundo os parâmetros de Bas van Fraassen esses objetos celestes seriam observáveis. Ora, tais astros poderiam sem dúvida ser observados diretamente (sem a necessidade de instrumentos), nas condições apropriadas. Mas, acrescenta Kosso, “esse tipo de epistemologia externalista, que permite que a justificação se baseie em informação que não temos a disposição (nós não (...) estamos em condição de ver planetas extrassolares a olho nu [atualmente]), não ajuda a decidir quais particulares afirmações científicas garantem a crença” (Kosso 2006, 225, nota 1). Van Fraassen provavelmente incorre em uma petição de princípio não muito diferente daquelas que ele muitas vezes desmascarou em textos de autores realistas, quando apela para o fato de o objeto detectado ser observável, para atribuir o estatuto de ‘observação’ a uma certa detecção. O ponto é, mais uma vez, entender o que vale como observação, particularmente quando isso envolve o uso de algum instrumento. Endossar aquilo que Otávio Bueno chama de ‘padrão internalista’ parece garantir solidez à qualificação de determinadas ações como observações. Uma das principais consequências dessa adoção é que tal critério, não operando nenhuma distinção relevante entre detecções ‘diretas’ e detecções mediadas por instrumentos, permite que a linha que separa observáveis e inobserváveis seja traçada de maneira diferente de como van Fraassen acredita que deveria ser, abarcando, entre os observáveis, mais (tipos de) entidades do que esse parece estar disposto a admitir. (shrink)

This is the Portuguese translation of Kathleen Okruhlik's paper "Bas van Fraassen’s Philosophy of Science and His Epistemic Voluntarism" (2014) Bas van Fraassen’s anti-realist account of science has played a major role in shaping recent philosophy of science. His constructive empiricism, in particular, has been widely discussed and criticized in the journal literature and is a standard topic in philosophy of science course curricula. Other aspects of his empiricism are less well known, including his empiricist account of scientific laws, his (...) relatively recent re-evaluation of what it is to be an empiricist, and his empiricist structuralism. This essay attempts to provide an overview of these diverse aspects of van Fraassen’s empiricism and to show how they relate to one another. It also focuses on the nature of van Fraassens’s epistemic voluntarism and its relationship to his empiricist philosophy of science. (shrink)

The notion of epistemic community is crucial for the characterization of observability, a cornerstone for Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. As a matter of fact, observable is, to him, a short for observable-by-us. In this work, it will be shown that the alleged rigidity of the author of The Scientific Image, apparently not very keen to admitting changes in the epistemic community (constituted – according to him – by the human race), is actually an assumption of modesty and good judgment; (...) it means recognizing that scientific enterprise is just a human activity, among many others. (shrink)

The emphasis on the role of observation, one of the hallmarks of Empiricism, is reaffirmed by the primacy of the distinction between observable and unobservable in Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. In this paper it will be showed that, despite being one the main topics of discussion in contemporary philosophy of science, particularly thanks to van Fraassen, the question of observation and observability is actually so old as philosophy itself and has to do with the willingness, that defines empiricism, to (...) keep ‘within the limits’. (shrink)

In 1985, Alan Musgrave raised a serious objection against the possibility that a constructive empiricist could coherently draw the distinction between observables and unobservables. In his brief response in the same year, Bas van Fraassen claimed that Musgrave’s argument only works within the so-called ‘syntactic view’ of theories, while it loses its force in the context of the ‘semantic view’. But this response was not adequate, or so claimed F. A. Muller, who published two articles in order to extend the (...) epistemology of constructive empiricism. In order to do so, Muller provided a rigorous characterization of observability that requires the use of modal logic. The outcome was a new epistemology for constructive empiricism, which van Fraassen apparently endorsed. As will be shown in this article, however, Muller’s extended epistemology is superfluous. Moreover, and more importantly, Musgrave’s argument seems to be a pseudo-problem. (shrink)

The concept of observability is of key importance for a consistent defense of Constructive Empiricism. This anti-realist position, originally presented in 1980 by Bas van Fraassen in his book The Scientific Image, crucially depends on the observable/unobservable dichotomy. Nevertheless, the question of what it means to observe has been faced in an unsatisfactory and inadequate manner by van Fraassen and this represents an important lacuna in his philosophical position. The aim of this work is to propose a characterization of the (...) act of observation able to give the necessary support to the ‘rough guide’ of ‘observable’ that can be found in the aforementioned book. Countering van Fraassen’s own statements, that observability is not a matter for philosophy, but for scientific inquiry only, we maintain that any attempt to deal with this subject by the philosophers is legitimate. We will show that van Fraassen ended up doing a philosophical analysis of observation himself, albeit in a fragmentary way. We believe that this question should be dealt with methodically, though, ‘following the rules’ of a ‘proper’ philosophical analysis, as we attempted to do in this work. We will propose a way of conceiving the act of observation, different from van Fraassen’s one, that can help not only to ground the distinction between observable and unobservable, upon which Constructive Empiricism rests, but to get this anti-realist position closer to scientific practice as well, which is one of its desiderata. Without neglecting the philosophical dimension of the issue, though. However, this proposal does not represent an ad hoc ‘solution’ for Constructive Empiricism, but a characterization aspiring to have a universal reach. (shrink)

Observation and observability represent a crucial topic in the philosophy of science, as the huge production of papers and books on the subject attests. Philosophy of perception, on the other hand, is a field of study that took root effectively in the last decades. Even then, apparently, the main theories on observation have neglected the issue of determining which is the object of a successful perception. As a consequence, some theses that have recently been proposed are actually paradoxical, despite deriving (...) from renowned and, prima facie, satisfactory and complete theories. This is the situation of van Fraassen’s assertions on the (putative?) observation of images and rainbows (see 2001 and 2008) and of Sorensen’s claims on what one actually sees during a solar eclipse (see 2008). After putting forward a possible characterization of the object of perception, with no need of discussing the issue of intentionality, in this paper it will be shown that devoting adequate attention to this topic, together with acknowledging that observation is an action, in which the subject plays an indeed active role, would make it possible to avoid drawing conclusions that do not seem to be correct, such as the ones just mentioned. Any theory about observation will only be complete and adequate provided the object of perception is taken into account. (shrink)

El hombre posmoderno es un Narciso en busca de su identidad. La evaporación del Padre ha camiado las dinámicas en relación con el Otro y la capacidad de construir una propia identidad tiene que recurrir a los objetos de consumo. En este estudio se propone un camino que va desde la teoría clásica del Psicoanálisis hasta una nueva perspectiva que entra en el campo del Márketing y del estudio de objeto de consumo.

Aspetti filosofico-matematici dei celebri paradossi di Zenone di Elea.

NOTA PRELIMINAR: o texto a seguir representa a versão ampliada (e corrigida conforme as indicações dos pareceristas) do artigo homônimo, publicado na revista Archai em 2014. Por algum problema técnico, acabou sendo publicada, na época, a primeira versão, sem as melhorias sugeridas pelos avaliadores. Eis, então, a versão ‘definitiva’ do artigo “Zenão e a impossibilidade da analogia”: -/- A reductio ad absurdum foi elevada por Zenão de Eléia a único método que permitiria vislumbrar a verdadeira realidade, invisível tanto aos sentidos (...) quanto à maneira de pensar comum. Mostrando uma certa continuidade com os filósofos anteriores, não só na busca de um procedimento para que a especulação pudesse avançar, como também na mesma rota de afastamento daquilo que é mais próximo, conhecido e particular (visível) em direção àquilo que é menos conhecido, distante e universal (invisível), para dizê-lo em termos aristotélicos, Zenão utilizou-se de argumentos aporéticos como único caminho possível para poder entrever o ‘reino do Ser’. Esse, com efeito, é invisível não somente aos nossos sentidos, como também ao nosso raciocínio ordinário. Eis que somente a ‘via do não-ser’, a única que poderia ser trilhada após Parménides, como diz Wolff, nos permite ter uma ideia, por quanto vaga, daquilo que é ‘verdadeiramente invisível’. Tão invisível ao ponto de ser inalcançável até mesmo pelo pensamento. (shrink)

The reductio ad absurdum has been elected by Zeno as the only method permitting to descry the true reality, invisible both to the senses and to the common way of thinking. Showing some continuity with the previous philosophers, not only in the search for a procedure in order to speculation to advance, but also on the same route departing from what is nearer, more acquainted and particular (visible) toward what is less acquainted, more distant and universal (invisible), to say it (...) with aristotelic words, Zeno made use of aporetic arguments as the only possible way to catch a glimpse of the ‘domain of Being’. This, in fact, is invisible not only to our senses, but also to our ordinary reasoning. Therefore, just the ‘way of not-being’, the only one that could be walked after Parmenides, as Wolff says, allows us to have an insight of what is ‘really invisible’. So invisible that it is unreachable also to thought. (shrink)

Martin Kusch has recently defended Bas van Fraassen’s controversial view on microscopes, according to which these devices are not ‘windows on an invisible world’, but rather ‘image generators’. The two authors also claim that, since in a microscopic detection it is not possible to empirically investigate the geometrical relations between all the elements involved, one is entitled to maintain an agnostic stance about the reality of the entity allegedly represented by the produced image. In this paper I argue that, contrary (...) to what Kusch maintains, this might not be a neutral way to render scientific evidence. Moreover, a constructive empiricist can support a realist interpretation of microscopic images. In fact, constructive empiricism and van Fraassen’s own anti-realism do not necessarily amount to the same thing. (shrink)

This is a critical review of the book Variational Approach to Gravity Field Theories - From Newton to Einstein and Beyond (2017), written by the Italian astrophysicist Alberto Vecchiato. In his work, Vecchiato shows that physics, as we know it, can be built up from simple mathematical models that become more complex step by step by gradually introducing new principles. The reader is invited to follow the steps that lead from classical physics to relativity and to understand how this happens (...) and why. Moreover, while presenting the variational approach to gravity field theories in a clear and elegant manner, Vecchiato shows a constant worry in leading the readers in such a way that they understand the relevance of what the author considers to be the most powerful technique and unifying concept of theoretical physics - and how it works. Each chapter is enriched with exercises, of which a step-by-step solution is offered, so that the reader can gain a real insight into the topic presented and follow the reading as fruitfully as possible. The most innovative aspect of the book, however, is not the rigorousness and the clarity of the treatment of the variational approach, but rather the point of view that Vecchiato keeps and that the reader is led to endorse too: physics is a human enterprise, prone to error and open to improvement, and not a complete and definite system of truths about our world. (shrink)

Is there an ontological question relative to van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism? It seems so, despite this philosophical position, a reference for contemporary Empiricism, presenting itself as an epistemological thesis. It is, furthermore, a very up-to-date matter, as the Dutch philosopher has recently changed his mind about the possibility for us to observe common optical phenomena as the rainbow. This reveals the necessity for a discussion about the concept of phenomena as used by van Fraassen, as Foss stated more than twenty (...) years ago, but also – and this is an intertwined question – about what ontology is assumed by Constructive Empiricism. (shrink)

Au sein de la production de Cesare Lombroso, La Femme criminelle, ouvrage consacré à la criminalité féminine qu’il publie avec Guglielmo Ferrero en 1893, marque le moment où le criminaliste italien intègre de façon systématique l’univers animal dans ses explications de la déviance. Il mobilise alors une théorie générale de l’évolution centrée sur la féminité. L’article interroge le fonctionnement de ce dispositif sur le plan théorique et via un exemple précis : les brigandes. Il suggère que les stratégies textuelles et (...) visuelles de représentation, notamment de virilisation dont ces femmes font l’objet sont étroitement liées à la théorie de la « supériorité primitive de la femelle » et de l’indistinction entre les sexes chez les espèces animales « inférieures ». Paradoxalement, l’atavisme des criminelles les rapproche donc des qualités des hommes, en reprenant de façon perverse le chemin évolutif que la « femme normale », « homme arrêté dans son développement », a interrompu. (shrink)

O objetivo deste trabalho é estudar a relação que se estabelece entre as características da fenomenologia filosófica, a natureza do conhecimento que dela deriva e o modo como interfere sobre a produção do conhecimento em comunicação. Em primeiro lugar, observa-se a concepção de comunicação como processo transmissivo desenvolvida pelos clássicos estudos de mídia ou pelos processos de comunicação de massa. Em seguida, aproximam-se comunicação e semiótica como campos epistemológicos que, embora desenvolvam mútuas influências científicas, são, não raro, considerados áreas científicas (...) distintas atualmente, observa-se a emergência de outras bases de reflexão que podem aproximar a comunicação e a semiótica, enquanto áreas científicas. (shrink)

What is science? What is the distinction between scientific knowledge and living science, science of experience. Peirce's pragmatism. The scientific dimension of Peirce's categories: deduction, abduction, induction. Induction as a connection between the abductive hypothesis, that is only probable and the generation of a deductive and indispensable law that characterises behavior habits.Que é ciência? A distinção entre conhecimento científico e ciência como coisa viva, ciência da experiência. A dimensão científica das categorias de Peirce: dedução, abdução, indução. Pragmatismo peirceano. A indução (...) como elemento de ligação entre a hipótese explicativa abdutiva apenas provável e a geração de uma lei dedutiva, necessária porque normativa para hábitos de conduta. (shrink)

O presente artigo busca refletir sobre a fragmentação da Moral na contemporaneidade a partir da obra de Charles Taylor, denominada As Fontes do Self. A partir da obra After Virtue, procura também presentificar as ideias de Alasdair MacIntyre, autor que destaca a situação atual da moralidade. Para Taylor, a sociedade contemporânea sofre de um agudo mal-estar que tem suas raízes no individualismo, manifestando-se numa perda de sentido da vida e na fragmentação da moral. Para MacIntyre, a moral, desde a modernidade, (...) está em profunda desordem, pois possuem-se apenas fragmentos de um esquema conceitual que, juntos, não formam mais um todo coerente. Mediante as diferentes visões dos dois filósofos, o estudo pretende localizar as bases comuns em seus argumentos bem como certos distanciamentos em se tratando da estreita ligação entre Self e Moral. Suas pesquisas estão fundamentadas em autores clássicos, como Platão e Aristóteles, cujas influências ultrapassaram o horizonte histórico de suas épocas e se fazem perceber na contemporaneidade. Palavras-chave : Self. Ética das virtudes. Moralidade. Dependência. Contemporaneidade. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the prehistory of quantum gravity (1916–1930) from two perspectives. First, we investigate how this research field constituted itself and we propose for the first time a red thread to trace its evolution in this earliest period. Second, we focus on a case study: the earliest work of Léon Rosenfeld. In 1927 he tried to merge wave mechanics with general relativity in the context of a five‐dimensional universe. We describe how Oskar Klein, Louis de Broglie, and (...) Théophile De Donder influenced Rosenfeld's work and analyze how and why Rosenfeld attempted to reconcile Einstein's theory with quantum phenomena. We argue that Rosenfeld investigated for the first time the corrections to a classical space‐time metric generated by a quantum source. As far as we know, Rosenfeld's approach has been largely ignored until today: he himself considered it “an accident.” After having reconsidered its connection with de Broglie's ideas and Rosenfeld's interpretation of the wave function in 1927, we argue that Rosenfeld's work can be interpreted as a first attempt to introduce the pilot‐wave theory in the context of quantum gravity and we infer that this was one of the reasons that ruled it out. (shrink)